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Many commentators have sounded the death knell for party identification. For example, Dalton claims 
that we are witnessing a general process of partisan dealignment and that this trend ‘reflects long-
term and enduring characteristics of advanced industrial societies’ (Dalton 2002, p. 29). Like many 
other countries, Ireland experienced a sustained period of political dealignment, beginning in the 
1970s (or earlier) and continuing right through to the new millennium. In Eurobarometer polls taken 
in the late 1970s, approximately two thirds of Irish respondents described themselves as being close 
to a political party; this had declined to 40 per cent by the mid-1990s (Mair and Marsh 2004, 242). As 
reported below, just over one quarter of respondents admitted to feeling close to a party in Irish 
National Election Study (INES) surveys conducted in 2002 and 2007, and this fell even further in in 
2011.  
 
This is an important and, for many observers, worrying development. Partisanship is associated with 
political engagement, and is also seen by some as providing the stability necessary for a functioning 
representative democracy. As Rosenblum argues, ‘partisans are carriers of a more extended story 
about the party than may be told by the candidates of the moment’. Their long-term focus and 
attention to their party, even outside election years, acts as a ‘check on short-term, arrant, political 
considerations’ by their party, as well as providing support and sustenance to the party following 
electoral defeat (Rosenblum 2010, p. 355). A dealigned electorate, by contrast, is usually associated 
with disengagement, the growth of anti-establishment populism, and above all political instability 
(Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2004, p. 222; Mair 2013, p. 19).  
 
Dealignment is one potential explanation for the high levels of volatility observed in 2011 and 2016 
elections in Ireland, as argued by Marsh and McElroy (2016, p. 159).  Not only were these the two 
most volatile elections in the history of the state, they also rank among the ten most volatile elections 
2 
 
in post-war Western Europe (Farrell and Suiter 2016). Fianna Fáil, which had been the biggest party in 
every general election since 1927, lost over 70 per cent of its seats in 2011; Labour lost an even larger 
proportion of its seats in 2016. A number of new parties emerged during this period, and a record 
number of voters turned away from political parties altogether and voted instead for Independent 
candidates. If these are symptoms of a dealigned electorate, then electoral volatility is likely to be 
here to stay.  
 
Yet at other times and in other contexts, long-term declines in party identification have been reversed 
following a ‘critical’ election which disrupts the old political order and subsequent ‘cementing’ 
elections in which new political alignments become embedded (Miller and Shanks 1996; Wattenberg 
1996, p. 138).  The 2011 and 2016 Irish general elections could conceivably fit this pattern. As 
described by Burnham  (1970), critical elections ‘are closely associated with abnormal stress in the 
socioeconomic system (and) are marked by ideological polarizations and issue-distances between the 
major parties which are exceptionally large by normal standards’. The 2011 election in Ireland was 
preceded by an unprecedented level of economic stress leading to the ‘bailout’ by the EU and IMF; 
and the economic consensus that had dominated party politics during the 2000s gave way to greater 
political polarization.  
 
It is clear that the elections of 2011 and 2016 dramatically changed the Irish party system. The 
question that this chapter seeks to answer is whether the electoral turbulence was a simply a 
symptom of a fundamentally dealigned electorate, or whether we are witnessing a realignment in Irish 
politics. In other words, has the number of floating voters increased in the wake of the crisis, or have 
people begun to form new party attachments that are likely to shape elections in the future? To 
address this question, this chapter will examine both the level and direction of party attachment in 
Ireland between 2002 and 2016.  The chapter is organised as follows. First, the debates about the 
concept of party identification are introduced, and the meaning and measurement of party 
identification in Ireland is assessed using panel data from the Irish National Election Study (2002-
2007). Next, arguments about partisan change (dealignment and realignment) are discussed, before 
presenting evidence on the evolution of partisanship in Ireland in the period 2002-2016, using the full 
set of INES studies. The chapter concludes by discussing what these findings imply for future elections 






The meaning and measurement of party identification in Ireland   
 
Despite its importance to generations of electoral researchers, party identification remains a highly 
contested concept.  The traditional account, found in ‘The American Voter’, is that party identification 
is a lasting psychological attachment to a party or (according to a more recent restatement) a sense 
of belonging to a partisan group (Campbell et al. 1964, p. 67; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2004, p. 
8; Miller and Shanks 1996, p. 120). These attachments form relatively early in life, due to a 
combination of family and peer group influences and the political environment during an individual’s 
first experiences of voting (Miller and Shanks 1996, p. 128-132).  Once established, party attachments 
are expected to be highly stable, and become more ingrained over time.  One of the main reasons for 
this stability, according to this view, is that partisanship is causally prior to and has a significant impact 
on many other political attitudes. In the words of Campbell et al. (1964, p. 76), ‘identification with a 
party raises a perceptual screen through which the individual tends to see what is favourable to his 
partisan orientation’.  Partisanship is therefore seen as an exogenous factor exerting enormous 
influence on long-term electoral trends.    
 
There are a number of important critiques of this argument. A revisionist view assigns much less 
significance to party identification as a driver of other political attitudes.  For Fiorina (1981, p. 84), 
partisanship is nothing more than a ‘running tally’ of an individual’s evaluations of party performance. 
This account treats partisanship as a rational assessment rather than as a psychological attachment.  
As such, it is much more susceptible to change in response to short-term political events, and not the 
important explanatory variable that the authors of ‘The American Voter’ assumed. Thomson (2017) 
provides evidence in support of this revisionist view of partisanship in the Irish case. 
 
A second line of criticism is that party identification has little meaning outside the US. The usefulness 
of party identification as a concept is tied up with its stability: individuals may change their vote in 
response to short-term factors, but partisanship is far stickier, and hence a better predictor of future 
behaviour. However, in some European contexts, party identification was found to covary strongly 
with the vote (LeDuc 1981; Thomassen 1976). If party identification is synonymous with the vote, it 
loses its usefulness as an independent variable to explain long-term electoral patterns.  The lack of 
applicability of the concept to many European countries is generally believed to derive from the very 
importance of political parties in structuring choice. Particularly in list-based electoral systems, where 
voters are essentially choosing between parties rather than candidates, voters are very unlikely to 
vote against their party identification. Furthermore, voters in many European countries have 
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traditionally held strong class and religious identities, and these have been dominant over party 
identities.   
 
However, these arguments do not necessarily apply to the Irish case, which resembles the US in a 
number of ways that makes party identification a more useful concept than it is in many other 
European countries. Voting in Ireland has traditionally not been driven by strong social group or class 
identities, so party identities could potentially fill this gap. The Irish electoral system is far more 
candidate-centred than most other European countries, so how you vote and which party you support 
are not necessarily the same things. As Marsh notes, ‘If party identification proved to be a useful 
concept anywhere in Europe, Ireland would seem to be a prime candidate’ (Marsh 2006, p. 491).  
 
Yet there are significant measurement issues that arise when applying the concept of party 
identification outside the US, including in Ireland. The original formulation, still used in American 
National Election Studies, explicitly focuses on the respondent’s self-identity (‘Generally speaking, do 
you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent or what?’).  This approach 
has not been widely exported, for a number of reasons. On a practical level, it is difficult to formulate 
the question in this way in a multi-party context, particularly when there are no widely used nouns to 
refer to different partisan groups (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2004, p. 169)1. It is also more likely 
that individuals will identify with more than one party in a context where several parties are spread 
out across the ideological spectrum.  
 
It is more common in European surveys to measure party identification in terms of closeness to a 
party, and this is the approach used in the Irish National Election Study. The sequence of questions is 
as follows2: 
1. ‘Do you usually think of yourself as close to any political party?  
o [If yes] ‘Which party is that?’ 
2. [If no] ‘Do you feel yourself a little closer to one of the political parties than the others?’ 
o [If yes] ‘Which party is that’? 
 
 While this measure is arguably further removed from the concept of psychological attachment than 
the original formulation, it does focus the respondent’s attention on long-term attachment. Barnes et 
al. (1988) find that the two approaches produce scales that are highly correlated and similar in terms 




Most previous research has measured partisanship in terms of the first of these two questions, 
treating those who reported feeling ‘a little closer’ to one of the parties as non-partisans (Marsh and 
Tilley 2010; Thomson 2017). However, movement over time from having no party attachment to 
feeling a little closer to one party (or vice versa) may be an important indicator of realignment or 
dealignment. This chapter therefore distinguishes between three types of voters: ‘partisans’ (those 
answering in affirmative to question 1 above); ‘leaners’ (those answering yes to the second question 
above); and ‘non-partisans’ (those answering no to both questions).  
 
Before proceeding to the main analysis in the next section, I first compare these three different 
categories of voters using the 2002-2007 INES panel data. The reason for this exercise is to determine 
whether ‘leaners’ are more like partisans or non-partisans in terms of their voting behaviour and 
attitudes. This is an important consideration when it comes to interpreting changing levels of 
partisanship in the aftermath of the financial crisis.   
 
Partisan stability implies that party identifiers will be more stable in their vote over time compared to 
non-partisans.  Table 5.1 compares the stability of voting preferences of our three categories of 
respondents in the period 2002 to 2007.  Respondents are categorised according to whether they 
voted for the same party in 2002 and 2007 or changed their vote3. The second column shows the 
percentage of respondents who voted for the same party in both elections.  As expected, there are 
significant differences between those who identified with the party they voted for in 2002 and those 
who did not. For respondents who felt close to the party they voted for in 2002, 77 per cent went on 
to vote for the party again in 2007. For those categorised as ‘leaners’ in 2002, 64 per cent went on to 
vote for the party in 2007. In contrast, only 43 per cent of those who did not feel close to the party 




A similar picture emerges when we look at respondent’s assessments in 2007 of the probability (on a 
scale of 1-10) that they will ever vote for the party that they voted for in 2002.  As reported in the 
right-hand column in table 5.1, the average probability score is 8.63 for partisans, 7.88 for ‘leaners’ 
and 6.94 for non-partisans. In both of these sets of analyses, the difference between non-partisans, 
‘leaners’ and partisans are statistically significant.  Both reported vote and probability to vote 
therefore tell the same story: partisans have more stable vote preferences over time than ‘leaners’, 




According to the psychological account, party identification is stable in part because it shapes how 
people interpret new political information. As Zaller put it, ‘people tend to accept what is congenial 
to their partisan values and to reject what is not’ (1992, p. 242). For instance, partisans are expected 
to exhibit bias in how they perceive objective conditions (Bartels 2002).  INES respondents in 2007 
were asked whether they thought various aspects of the country (the economy, the housing situation, 
crime, and the health service) had improved or disimproved over the previous five years.  Respondents 
who identified with the main government party (Fianna Fáil) should, according to the theory, be more 
likely than other respondents to say that things had improved. To ensure that the direction of 
causation is not the other way around (i.e. respondents develop an identification with Fianna Fáil 
because they believed that things had improved), respondents are categorised based on their 
partisanship in 2002.  
 
Each of the four items (economy, housing, crime, health) is measured on a 5-point scale. Where 
appropriate the items are reversed so that in all cases lower scores indicate that a respondent believed 
things had improved, while high scores indicate that a respondent thought things had gotten worse. 
As table 5.2 shows, for all of these items except ‘crime’, respondents who identified with Fianna Fáil 
in 2002 were significantly more likely to believe that things had improved in 2007.   There is no 
noticeable difference between partisans and ‘leaners’ in this regard. In contrast, those who voted for 
Fianna Fáil in 2002 but did not claim an attachment to the party were no different than other 
respondents in how they perceived these conditions.  
  
<TABLE 5.2>  
 
The evidence presented in tables 1 and 2 shows that partisanship has a significant effect on both the 
behaviour and attitudes of Irish voters. Partisans are more likely to be stable in their vote choice from 
one election to the next; and they are more likely to perceive economic and social conditions in a 
positive light when their party is in office. What is more, these effects are found even among those 
classified here as ‘leaners’.  This is in line with research in the US that finds that voters who describe 
themselves as ‘Independent’, but in a follow on question admit to feeling closer to one or other of the 
parties, actually behave very similarly to outright party identifiers (Keith et al. 1992). It is therefore 
important not to ignore ‘leaners’ when examining trends in party identification over time, which is the 





Changing patterns of party identification in Ireland 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, it is often claimed that the level of mass partisanship is in decline in 
advanced industrial democracies (e.g. Dalton 2002; Mair 2013). One prominent explanation for this is 
that dealignment occurs as a result of ‘cognitive mobilisation’. Due to the complexity of politics, 
making an informed voting decision can be difficult. Rather than making up their minds afresh at each 
election, voters form long-term attachments to a party, and this serves as a short-cut to help them 
interpret political information. In this view, party attachments are formed by voters who lack the time 
and resources to make a fully informed decision. When voters become more politically sophisticated 
due to higher levels of education and greater access to information, they become less dependent on 
partisan cues (Dalton 2002, p. 29). 
 
However, such broad-brush theories fail to account for the fact that the patterns of dealignment have 
not been uniform across countries. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that in some countries the 
level of partisanship has actually increased in recent years (Andeweg and Farrell, 2017). A more 
explicitly political explanation is needed to account for such country-specific patterns. One such 
argument is that the level of party identification is linked to the degree of party polarization in a 
country (Hetherington 2001; Lupu 2015; Schmitt and Holmberg 1995; Smidt 2015). Party attachments, 
in this account, are most likely to form during times when clear ideological and policy differences exist 
between parties. When parties converge, they arouse more muted emotional responses among 
voters, and voters who come of age at times of party convergence are less likely to form strong 
attachments. Growing dealignment is therefore a symptom of the narrowing of the policy space 
between mainstream parties. In contrast to cognitive mobilisation, however, political convergence is 
not all one-way-traffic. Party systems can undergo periods of polarization as well as convergence, and 
according to this view we should expect to see increases in party attachment among young voters at 
such times.    
 
In support of this argument, Hetherington (2001) finds that a resurgence of mass partisanship in the 
United States has occurred as a result of growing polarization at the elite level. Smidt (2015) finds that 
independent voters in the US have begun to behave more like loyal party supporters as a consequence 
of party polarization. In a cross-national study, Lupu (2015) finds a strong correlation between the 




This political explanation for patterns of partisanship fits neatly with the well-developed literature on 
realignments. There is convincing evidence from the US that periods of gradual dealignment have 
been reversed by ‘critical elections’ which have revitalised politics and led to an increase in party 
identification in subsequent years, often along different socio-demographic lines than before. As 
described by V.O. Key, these are elections ‘in which the depth and intensity of electoral involvement 
are high, in which more or less profound readjustments occur in the relations of power within the 
community, and in which new and durable electoral groupings are formed’ (1955, 4). Critical elections 
are often associated with an increase in party polarization, which is one of the reasons that they can 
reinvigorate partisanship (Burnham 1970). 
 
As argued in the introduction to this chapter, the 2011 election In Ireland bears all the hallmarks of a 
critical election. As with other critical elections, it was associated with a noticeable increase in party 
polarization. This is clear from the INES surveys, where voters are asked where they think each party 
is located on a left-right scale.  Party polarization can be measured using the method recommended 
by Dalton (2008), which takes account of both the policy positions of parties and their size4. According 
to this measure, which has a theoretical range from zero (when all parties occupy the same position) 
to ten (when parties are equally divided at opposite ends of the left-right spectrum), party polarization 
in Ireland was 2.3 in 2002, 2.0 in 2007, 2.7 in 2011 and 3.0 in 2016. This is a very substantial increase 
in polarization, much higher than the vast majority of cases analyzed by Dalton, who compared 
changes in polarization across a wide range of established democracies (2008, p. 907).  
To test the critical election argument, I examine the evolution of partisanship over the full period of 
the INES series (2002, 2007, 2011 and 2016), paying particular attention to generational differences5. 
If realignment is taking place, we should observe an increase in the level of partisanship and changes 
in the direction of partisanship (i.e. which parties people feel close to) in the 2016 election compared 
to the pre-bailout elections (2002 and 2007), particularly among younger voters. In contrast, if 
dealignment is continuing, we will observe a pattern of decline in party identification over the period, 
particularly among younger cohorts. 
 
Turning first to the extent and intensity of partisanship over time, figure 5.1 divides the electorate in 
each election year into the three categories introduced previously: partisans, ‘leaners’ and non-
partisans. Figure 5.1 appears to provide some support for the realignment argument.  In 2002 and 
2007, almost half the electorate expressed no attachment to a party, while the other half were evenly 
split between partisans and ‘leaners’.  In 2011, non-partisans made up almost two-thirds of the 
electorate; this was due to a decline in the proportion of partisans (from 27 per cent in 2007 to 21 per 
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cent) and a very sharp decline in the proportion of ‘leaners’ (from 26 per cent to 15 per cent).  This 
trend was dramatically reversed in 2016. Here we find by far the lowest proportion of non-partisans 
in the series (at 34 per cent), while the proportion of partisans increased to 31 per cent and the 
proportion of ‘leaners’ increased to almost 36 per cent6.  Given that ‘leaners’ exhibit many of the traits 
of more committed partisans in terms of voting behaviour and attitudinal bias, the sharp increase in 





Related to this, parties also evoked stronger feelings among voters in 2016 compared to previous 
years. Some researchers use the percentage of citizens with positive feelings toward one or more 
party and negative feelings towards one or more parties as an indicator of partisanship (e.g. 
Hetherington 2001). In all INES surveys, respondents were asked what they thought about each party 
in terms of a scale from 0 (strongly dislike) to 10 (strongly like). In 2002, 56% of respondents indicated 
that they liked one or more party (gave them a score of 7 or more) and also disliked at least one party 
(gave them a score of 3 or less). By 2016, this increased to 78%, by far the highest of any year in the 
series.  
 
The realignment argument implies that increases in partisanship should be strongest among younger 
cohorts. This would be in stark contrast to previously observed patterns in Ireland. Mair and Marsh 
(2004) found decreasing levels of partisanship in Ireland both over time and across generations in the 
period 1978-1994: each generation exhibited lower levels of partisanship than its predecessor, and 
for each generation they observed a decline in party identification over time. This analysis is replicated 
in figure 5.2 using the INES data. Respondents are divided into three cohorts: those born prior to 1960; 
those born in the 1960s and 1970s, and those born after 1979.  The panel on the left shows the 
percentage of respondents who are ‘close to’ or ‘a little bit closer to’ a party (i.e. partisans plus 




The results using the more encompassing measure of partisanship (the left-hand panel) are quite 
different from those for the earlier period reported in Mair and Marsh (2004). First of all, as we have 
already seen, there is no consistent pattern over time in the level of partisanship: a decrease in the 
number of partisans across all generations in 2011 is followed by a sharp increase across all 
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generations in 2016. Secondly, the generational pattern also changes over time. While in the period 
2002-2011, the youngest generation is the least aligned, the reverse is true in 2016. Remarkably, the 
percentage of aligned voters among the generation born after 1979 (often referred to as the 
‘millennial’ generation) increases from 29 per cent in 2011 to 72 per cent in 2016. This is significantly 
higher than the figure of 61 per cent for the generation born in the 1960s and 1970s, and marginally 
above that of the oldest cohort (at 69 per cent aligned). This would appear to be a telling piece of 
evidence in support of the realignment thesis.  However, if we exclude ‘leaners’ from our measure of 
partisanship (see the right-hand panel in figure 5.2), this dramatic change among the youngest cohort 
disappears.  Rather, the youngest cohort remains the least-aligned of the generations using this 
narrower measure. This suggests that while many young voters acquired party attachments in the 
wake of the economic crisis, these attachments are rather weak. It remains to be seen whether or not 
these attachments become more deeply ingrained over time.  
 
To further test the realignment argument, it is necessary to also examine the direction of partisanship. 
Figure 5.3 plots the proportion of the electorate indicating attachment to each of the main political 
parties. As before, the panel on the left shows the percentage of partisans including ‘leaners’, while 
the panel on the right excludes ‘leaners’. It is evident from both graphs that the decline in partisanship 
in 2011 is accounted for almost entirely by the collapse in the number of voters identifying with Fianna 
Fáil, from close to 30 per cent (including ‘leaners’) in 2002 and 2007 to 11 per cent in 2011. Fianna Fáil 
partisanship rebounded somewhat in 2016, but remained far below the pre-crisis level. In contrast, 
both Fine Gael and Sinn Féin experienced a steady increase in partisan supporters over the period, 
with Fine Gael marginally ahead of Fianna Fáil as the party with the highest number of partisan 
identifiers in 2016. Identification with the smaller parties (the category ‘others’ includes at various 
points the Greens, PDs, AAA-PBP, Social Democrats and Renua) is low for most of the period, but there 
is a sharp increase in 2016, particularly for the looser measure of partisanship shown in the left-hand 
panel. Overall, figure 5.3 shows that the patterns of identification in 2016 are much more fragmented 




The consistent rise in identification with Fine Gael is somewhat surprising, given that the party 
experienced a sharp decline in its vote share in 2016 compared to 2011.  It may be that some people 
who voted for Fine Gael for the first time in 2011 had by 2016 developed an identification with the 
party, while others proved to be only one-time voters. This interpretation is borne out by the data. 
Looking at the 2011 INES, only 18 per cent of new Fine Gael voters (i.e. those who did not vote for the 
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party in 2007) identified with the party in any way. By 2016, a majority (58 per cent) of those who 
switched to Fine Gael in 2011 and were now voting for the party for the second successive time 
considered themselves to be close to/a little close to the party. So while Fine Gael’s vote share peaked 
in 2011, the number of Fine Gael partisans grew considerably in 2016. In total, almost half (46 per 
cent) of Fine Gael partisans and leaners in 2016 were relatively new converts to the party, not having 
voted for them in 2007; this is far higher than the corresponding figure for Fianna Fáil (at 30 per cent).   
 
As with the level of partisanship, the direction of partisanship can be broken down by generation. 
According to the realignment hypothesis, we should expect to find that the changes in the direction 
of partisanship illustrated in figure 5.3 are most noticeable amongst the youngest generation.  Table 
5.3 provides a breakdown of partisanship in 2016 for each of the three generations defined previously.  
For completeness, smaller parties are now included separately rather than combining them. Each cell 
in table 5.3 shows the percentage of respondents from a particular generation that felt some 
identification with the party in question (i.e. partisans plus ‘leaners’; the corresponding figures when 
‘leaners’ are excluded are shown in parentheses). Among the oldest generation, Fianna Fáil and Fine 
Gael were still the two biggest partisan blocks in 2016 by a considerable margin. Just over half of 
respondents from this generation identified with or leaned towards one of these two parties, while 
relatively few identified with any other party. The level of identification with Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael 
was somewhat lower among the middle generation, and this was not replaced with a noticeable 
increase in identification with any other party. As expected it is among the youngest cohort that we 
find the most striking patterns. Here, identification with Fine Gael was relatively high (20 per cent if 
‘leaners’ are included), but identification with Fianna Fáil (12 per cent) was far lower than it was among 
the older cohorts. A number of other parties have substantial numbers of  partisans and ‘leaners’ 
among this cohort, including Sinn Féin (13 per cent), Social Democrats (8 per cent), and AAA-PBP (7 
per cent). The increased fragmentation in party identification shown in figure 5.3 is therefore driven 






The literature on realignments distinguishes between critical elections, characterised by dramatic 
political change, increased polarization and a rupture in the old patterns of party identification, and 
‘cementing’ elections where new patterns become embedded for the next generation of voters 
(Wattenberg 1996, p. 138). The findings presented here are not unequivocal, but they do provide 
some evidence that elections of 2011 and 2016 should be seen in this light.  If 2011 was the year where 
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old party attachments (at least as far as Fianna Fáil is concerned) were abandoned, by 2016 young 
voters in particular had begun to form new political allegiances.  
 
Two pieces of evidence support this conclusion. First, two thirds of respondents in the 2016 INES 
survey expressed some level of attachment to a party, which was almost double the figure from the 
previous election.  The increase in partisanship in 2016 was most evident younger voters who came 
of age during this turbulent period; remarkably, voters born after 1979 were more likely to admit to 
some party attachment than any other cohort.  This is highly unusual in comparison to previous 
elections, when younger voters were the least aligned.  
 
Second, the distribution of partisan attachments among parties was noticeably different in 2016 
compared to the pre-crisis elections. For example, in 2002 and 2007, almost 30 per cent of the 
electorate identified to some extent with Fianna Fáil and less than a quarter identified with another 
party; whereas in 2016 only 19 per cent identified in any way with Fianna Fáil and almost half the 
electorate identified with a different party. Again, these differences are particularly evident among 
the younger generation. This suggests that the fragmentation of the party system that occurred in 
2011 and 2016 is likely to persist. Assuming that party identifiers remain loyal to their party, the 
extreme volatility of the 2011 and 2016 elections may have been a temporary phenomenon.  
 
Yet while there is evidence of a nascent realignment among Irish voters, it is ultimately too soon after 
the critical election of 2011 to say with confidence what the long-term implications will be.  The 
increase in party identification in 2016 was primarily of the weaker sort – i.e. voters who said they felt 
only a little closer to one party than others. The analysis presented earlier in this chapter shows that 
these weak partisans do exhibit many of the same behavioural and attitudinal traits associated with 
more committed partisans. Nevertheless, it is quite possible that these weak attachments will not 
survive into the future. This is particularly so given that some of the parties that voters (particularly 
young voters) expressed an attachment to, such as the Social Democrats, were only a few months in 
existence at the time of the 2016 election. We should be sceptical of the extent to which voters can 
form lasting allegiances to parties in such a short space of time.  
 
To conclude, the question of whether the turbulence of the 2011 and 2016 elections should be seen 
as a symptom of dealignment or realignment can only be answered definitively in retrospect.  All we 
can say from this vantage point is that the evidence to date does not rule out the possibility that we 
are in the midst of a realignment that will shape Irish elections over the longer term.  Given that most 
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observers have expected that partisanship would continue its long-term decline in Ireland, even this 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 5.1: Stability of vote preference by party attachment, 2002-2007 
 Voted for same party in 2007 as 2002 (% 
respondents)   
2007 probability to vote for 
party voted for in 2002 
(mean score) 
2002 Partisans 77%** 8.63**  
2002 Leaners 64%** 7.88**  
2002 Non-partisans 43% 6.94 
All 55% 7.54 
Note: **p<0.01. Significance calculated in comparison to non-partisans. Partisans/leaners are respondents who 
said they felt close to/a little closer to the party that they voted for in 2002; non-partisans are respondents who 
did not feel close to the party they voted for in 2002.  
Source: INES 2002, 2007. 
 
 
Table 5.2. Perceived changes in conditions between 2002-2007 (respondents grouped according to 
2002 partisanship)  
 Economy (n=1149) Housing (n=982) Crime (n=1141) Health (n=1137) 
Fianna Fáil Partisans 1.87** 2.48** 3.98 3.06** 
Fianna Fáil Leaners  1.90** 2.48** 4.12 3.37** 
Fianna Fáil non-
partisan voters 
2.24 3.04 4.03 3.83 
Other respondents 2.32 3.00 4.10 3.90 
Note:  **p<0.01. Significance calculated in comparison to ‘Other’ respondents. Lower scores indicate a more 
positive view of how conditions have changed.  





Table 5.3: Direction of partisanship 2016, by generation 
 Pre-1960 1960-1979 1980- All 
Fianna Fáil 26 20 12 19 
 (15) (9) (5) (9) 
Fine Gael 25 19 20 21 
 (13) (9) (8) (10) 
Labour 4 5 6 5 
 (2) (2) (3) (2) 
Sinn Féin 8 10 13 10 
 (4) (6) (6) (5) 
Green 2 2 2 2 
 (1) (1) (1) (1) 
AAA-PBP 1 1 7 3 
 (1) (0) (2) (1) 
Social Democrats 3 3 8 5 
 (1) (1) (2) (1) 
Other 1 1 2 1 









Note: figures without parentheses include ‘leaners’; figures in parentheses exclude ‘leaners’.  






Figure 5.1: Levels of partisanship (INES data), 2002-2016 
 
Source: INES 2002, 2007, 2011, 2016. Data weighted for demographic factors and party vote shares. 
 
Figure 5.2: Levels of partisanship 2002-2016, by generation  
Including ‘leaners’ Excluding ‘leaners’ 
  
































































Figure 5.3: Direction of partisanship 2002-2016 
Including ‘leaners’ Excluding ‘leaners’ 
  


























1 Unlike the US, where voters habitually refer to themselves as a Democrat or Republic, nouns are not used to 
describe partisanship in Ireland (apart from in a derogatory sense, such as ‘Blueshirt’ (Fine Gael supporter) or 
‘Shinner’ (Sinn Féin supporter)). One could speculate that the fact that nouns to describe Irish partisan groups 
are not in common usage is an indication that these groupings are not an important part of people’s identity.  
On the other hand, lacking a word to describe it does not necessarily imply that people do not consider 
themselves as part of a partisan grouping. 
2 An additional question measuring the intensity of partisanship was also asked, but this chapter focuses on 
these two basic questions. 
3 Respondents who did not vote in one or more of the elections are excluded.   
4 This measure is based on the weighted average distance between each party and the policy centre on the left-
right dimension (where the policy centre is simply the weighted average of party positions).  
5 For 2016, the INES2 data is used.  
6 There were some differences in the sampling procedures used for each wave of the INES, which might affect 
the results. To test this, a sample matching procedure was used (Blackwell et. al. 2009) to select a set of 
respondents from the 2002 and 2016 surveys that were similar in terms of age, education, political interest, 
turnout, and left-right self-placement. Using the matched samples, significant differences still remain in terms 
of the level of party identification. In the unmatched data reported in Figure 5.1 the level of partisanship 
(including ‘leaners’) is 14.8% higher in 2016 compared to 2002. Using the matched data, the corresponding 
figure is 12.3%. This suggests that the growth in party identification recorded in the 2016 INES2 survey is not 
primarily due to differences in the nature of the sample.  It should be noted, however, that the level of 
partisanship found in the 2016 INES2 data is slightly higher than that found in the 2016 exit poll (INES1). 
Specifically, 27% of voters in the exit poll reported to be close to a party, compared to 32% of self-reported 
voters in the INES2 post-election survey. It is not possible to examine ‘leaners’ using the exit poll, as the 
relevant question was not asked. 
7 As a robustness check, table 5.3 was replicated using data from the 2016 exit poll (INES1). The exit poll only 
asked whether or not a respondent felt close to a party; it did not ask the follow-up question that identified 
‘leaners’ in the analyses in this chapter. Furthermore, the exit poll differs in that it does not include non-voters 
in the sample. Overall, the generational patterns in party identification in the exit poll are similar to those 
found in table 5.3. In particular, party identification among younger respondents in the exit poll is far more 
fragmented that among older generations. One noticeable difference, however, is that in contrast to the 
figures shown in table 5.3, Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil attract roughly equal numbers of partisan supporters 
among the youngest generation in the exit poll.    
                                                            
